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INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
This study rests on the assumption that the methods of science 
embodied in the general canons of the scientific enterprise (parti-
cularly in relation to theory formulation and validation) consti-
tute the realm of theoretical practice from which to develop a method-
ological and theoretical position relevant to the phenomenon of social 
conflict. 
In its historical development every scientific discipline has been 
faced with the problem of delineating its field of inquiry and giving 
explanation to major aspects within its particular field. No scienti-
fic discipline can claim to give a 'total' explanation of physical, 
social and cultural reality. To state this is to state a truism, but 
this in no way implies an easy solution to the problem the problem 
of delineating a field of study and of giving adequate explanation to 
the aspects of reality with which the discipline concerns itself. 
For sociology the problem is two-fold: methodological and theore-
tical. In short, the 'How' and .the 'What' of sociology. 
If the sociologist accepts the necessity of the construction of 
an adequate (as opposed to speculative or piecemeal) explanation then 
he/she is faced with the problem of constructing a scientific expla-
nation. This constitutes the methodological problematic.(!) 
Assuming, that the sociologist accepts that he/she is confronting social 
(as opposed to physical or cultural) reality, what theoretical assump-
tions, concepts, proposi~ions are required to develop a scientific theory 
of a particular aspect of so~ial reality? This constitutes the theore-
tical problematic. 
1. The word 'problematic' is used interchangeably with 'problem.' 
The problems dealt with in this study are seen in ~erms of the 
methodological and theoretical framework of sociology. Hence 
methodological and theoretical problematic of social conflict 
(within the framework of sociology viewed as a scient~fic discipline). 
' 
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The use of the term 'problem' or 'problematic' is not arbitrary. 
There are no clear-cut agreements with regard to the methodological 
and theoretical positions a sociologist should or can adopt. At both 
levels the sociologist encounters problems and enters not one but 
many courts of appeal. This study as a point of departure will be 
concerned only with the position which concedes the relevance of the 
general canons of the scientific method. The problems are therefore 
related to the applicability of the general canons of the scientific 
method. More specifically, the problems concern theory formulation 
and validation" (This will be fully discussed in subsequent chapters.) 
The canons of the scientific enterprise clearly include the deve-
lopment of a theory with a more or less explicit methodological and 
theoretical position. The development of a theory is seen as a pre-,. 
requisite of a scientific explanation of social conflict. This in-
volves the acceptance of theoretical activity or what is termed theore-
tical practicer (2) as vital to an explanation of the phenomenon of 
social conflict (assUming that the theoretical activity takes place 
within the framework of the scientific enterprise). 
There may of course be other approaches to methodological and 
theoretical problems concerning social conflict. For example, some 
may claim that it is not possible a prior.ito place sociology in any 
scientific methodological or theoretical court of appeal. It is not 
possible to be engaged in theoretical practice on the grounds that 
social reality can only be understood by 'experiencing' it. 
Parsons (1968, p.28, Vol. I) hns said: 
2 .. 
It is fundamental that there is no empirical knowledge 
which is not in some sense and to some degree conceptually 
formed. All talk of" pure sense data," "raw experience" or 
the unformed stream of consciousness is not descriptive of 
actual experience, but a matter of methodological abstrac-
tion 0000 In other words in Professor Henderson's phrase 
empirical observation is"in terms of a co~ceptual scheme. 11 
This is true not only of sophisticated scientific observation 
but of the simplest common sense statements of fact. 
Conceptual schemes in this sense are inherent in the struct-
ure of language ..•.••. 
Piaget, J. (Structuralism, Rcutledge & Kegal Paul Ltd., London 1971, 
p.l25) ref8r5 to Louis · Althusser's point that the development of 
a scientific theory constitutes theoretical practice. In other 




The claim that 'experiencing' social reality does not involve 
conceptualization rests on a misconception of the nature of human 
experience and language. All experience is to some degree concept-
ually formed. To claim that theoretical practice is not legitimate 
rests on a misconception of what language entails, whether scientific 
statements or 'common-sense' statements. Further, it is not the 
function of a scientific statement to reproduce experience. 
To deny that observation of social reality (which amounts to 
theoretical practice) is legitimate, denies the nature of human ex-
perience and human action itself. There is no reason to believe that 
"raw experience11 does not entail observation. Parsons (1968, p.723 
Vol. II ) maintains that~ 
Eliminating observation of the facts as an important 
element in the development of the theory of action 
really amounts to eliminating action itself, •••• 
For action itself in the relevant sense is not concei-
vable without some degree of correctness in observation 
of facts. 
To assert the importance of theoretical practice and observation 




The scientific adequacy of a theory rests on its confirma-
empirical fact, unless there be a purely fortuitous harmony 
the outline of the theory and the facts to which it refers. 
A claim which has received considerable attention in Western 
sociology 'particularly through C. Wright Mills' (1970) emphasis is 
that of a sociology geared to political and social issues. This 
claim is vitally important with regard to the relevance of sociology 
in view of the crises faced in Western Society. 
However, there is no guarantee that a 'relevant' sociology is 
automatically an adequately scientific sociology. This is not to 
be construed as an excuse for what C. Wright Mills (1970, Chapters 
2 anr:l 3) has called 11Abstracted Empiricism" or 11Grand Theory" but 
as a caution against empty polemic which admits of no confirmation or 





Sociologists cannot assume that "anything goes" or nyou pays 
your money and you takes your choice" (3) according to which there 
are alleged to be no serious scientific criteria by which to judge 
an explanation's adequacy. Though it may be necessary, it is simply 
not sufficient to claim that a sociologist should be aware or 'reflex-
ive' in Gouldner's (1971) sense. To claim as he does for a "Reflex-
ive Sociology" which makes the sociologist aware of his role and trans-
forms his existence,is no substitution for the claim that if sociology 
is to be relevant as a scientific discipline it cannot ignore the cri-
teria necessary for an adequate explanation of social reality. To 
say that it is important to study social conflict is not relevant 
without an adequate explanation of social conflict. 
In short, if sociologists do not know 'How' to study social 
reality or even 'What' they are studying it is d~fficult to conceive 
of sociology as becoming relevant with regard to social and political 
problems in Western Society. This is not to claim that action may 
not be relevant without a coherent theoretical framework, but that in 
some cases theoretical activity is vital to social and political acti-
vity. (Of course, if we deny conceptualization and observation then 
'raw experience' (regardless of the misconceptions on which it is 
based)becomes the only 'valid' (4) method of explanation of social 
and political action.) 
3. Parsons (11An Outline of the Social System" in Theories of Society, 
eds., Parsons et al, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965, p. 79) 
suggests that s9ciologists in presenting a theoretical view 
avoid n • • • the Charybdis of that formless eclecticism . . • accord-
ing to which 11 anything goes," or "you pays your money and you 
takes your choice." 
4. The fact that 'raw experience' becomes the only operative approach 






It is impossible within the scope of this study to consider in 
detail those arguments which deny the sociologist or for that matter 
anyone, the recognition that it is possible to work within the scien-
tific frame of reference in order to give an explanation of social 
reality or the phenomenon of social conflict. The arguments usually 
rest on the misconception of the nature of social reality or of the 
function of scientific explanation. It must be restated that no 
science aims at a 'total' explanation or a 'reproduction' of social 
reality. Parsons (1965, p. 70) strongly asserts: 
Science is not a photographic reproduction of reality, 
but is a highly selective mode of organizing man's 
orientation to reality. 
As stated previously this study rests on the assumption that the 
methods of science embodied in the general canons of the scientific 
enterprise (particularly in relation to theory formulation and vali-
dation), constitute the realm of theoretical practice from which to 
develop a methodological and theoretical position relevant to the 
phenomenon of social conflict. The canons of the scientific enter-
prise though necessary are not seen to be in themselves capable of 
yielding a 'total' explanation of social conflict. It is maintained 
that if sociologists choose to be engaged in the scientific enterprise, 
one aspect of which is theoretical practice, there are certain criteria 
from which the sociologist can approach the particular methodological 
problems the 'How', and the theoretical problems the 'What', 
with regard to the phenomenon of social conflict. Otherwise, and un-
fortunately, we fall the victims of formless eclecticism and speculative 
confusion in which "anything goes" or "you pays your money and you takes 
your choice.n 
Bottomore (1970, p. 138) remarked that sociologists are far from 
possessing an adequate theory of social conflict at the present time. 
Lewis Coser (1968, p. 26) suggests that while the early American socio-
logists recognized the importance of social conflict, the sociologists 
of the 1950's tended to neglect it as a major area of significance or 





Where is the modern sociology of conflict .•. since 
the time of such early pioneers as Small, Park and 
Ross little progress has been made ••• American socio-
logists in recent years have been content to leave the 
scientific study of conflict where Simmel left it. 
This is not to say that there t~as no interest at all in the pheno-
menon of social conflict after the period in which the founders of socio-
logy and the classical nineteenth - century writers made their studies. 
There has been a strong tradition of 'conflict' sociologists in the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Germany,and France. Generally speaking in the 
mid-fifties and in the sixties there was a rediscovery of the signifi-
cance of conflict a belated ~wakening to the character of this 
century, with its two world wars, its revolutionary movements, its na-
tional liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and its 
student rebellions. 
The ubiquity of conflict and its importance in shaping human affairs 
is obvious. From the social scientist however, more is expected than 
a simple acknowledgement of fact. Sociology must be able to furnish an 
adequate explanation of the historical causes, the effects and the 
variations of conflict. The development of an adequate theory is at 
times inhibited by the arguments of a 'consensus' (integration) versus 
a 'conflict' (coercion) approach to the study of social conflict. 
Coser (1970, p. 9) makes a relevant point when he maintains: 
I do not think that it can be shown that factors that make 
for societal conflict are more "fundamental" elements 
of the historical and social processes than those creating 
an underlying harmony, nor are events and behaviour that 
contribute to harmony more "essential 11 elements of social 
life. 
Coser agrees with Robin Williams Jr. that actual societies are held 
together by consensus, by interdependence and by social coercion and the 
task of social analysis is to show how social structures and processes 
operating in these ways can be predicted and explained. An analysis 
of social conflict does not therefore supplant analysis of other social 
processes. 
The task of this study is to examine some of the methodological and 
theoretical problems relevant to the analysis of social conflict, 
• 
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to develop a methodological and theoretical position which forms the 
basis of a general theory of social conflict. Some of the issues it 
will be apparent apply generally to sociological analysis whether con-
cerned with the phenomenon of social conflict or any other social 
process. It can be argued that the approach to social conflict should 
be more restricted, dealing directly with specific problems related 
to social conflict itself. However, when sociologists are engaged 
with the analysis of social conflict there are certain basic princi-
ples (methodological and theoretical) that are common to theoretical 
activity in sociology. It is the opinion of the author of this study 
that the sociologist studying social conflict cannot omit to grapple 
with the fundamental issues that concern the discipline of sociology 
in general. For the possibility of developing new insights rests on the 
ability of the sociologist to come to terms with the nagging problems 
that restrict the development of an adequate explanation whether of 
social conflict or other social processes. 
This study therefore deals with the methodological and theoretical 
issues which have a bearing on social conflict. The issues serve to 
locate the problem of explanation of social conflict, to define the 
framework within which the problems are posed and to develop an outline 
of a theory of social conflict. This task clearly includes the necess-
ity of developing an explicit methodological and theoretical position., 
Only by the concern with fundamental problems is it possible to reach a 
position to examine what the process of social conflict involves, what the 
definition of social conflict is and what an adequate theory entails 
(unless there be a purely fortuitous harmony between social conflict 
and an explanation thereof). If the importance of methodological issues 
is denied an easy concession to piecemeal speculation is made. If the 
importance of theoretical issues is denied an easy concession to formless 
ecleticism is made. 
The theoretical activity of this study is aimed at developing a 
sociology of social conflict and at illustrating that the commitment to 
a systematic explanation is by no means devoid of the problems which 
confront sociological analysis in general. 
• 
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OUTLINE OF STUDY 
This study, taking as a point of departure the importance of theore-
tical activity as included in the canons of the scientific method, is 
concerned with developing a methodological and theoretical position 
with regard to the phenomenon of social conflict. 
SECTION A: (Chapters II and III) 
Outlines the methodological criteria and assumptions adopted for the pur-
poses of giving an explanation to social conflict. 
CHAPTER II· deals generally with the methodological problems related 
to a sociological study of social conflict. The problems dis-
cussed are relevant to many of the methodological issues which con-
cern the sociologist in general whether interested in the phenomenon 
of social conflict or any other social process. These problems are 
so fundamental that it would be almost impertinent fort the socio:lo-
gist studying methodological problems in relation to social con-
flict to ignore them. 
CHAPTER III deals with the specific methodological position adopted for 
the purpose of this study. The position adopted is closely linked 
to the problems discussed in Chapter II. 
SECTION B: (Chapters pr and V) 
Outlines the theoretical criteria, assumptions, concepts and proposi-
tions relevant to a sociological explanation of social conflict. This 
attempt will have to be judged against the methodological position 
adopted. 
CHAPTER IV deals generally with the theoretical problems related to 
social conflict in terms of the Voluntaristic Postulate, and focuses 
on analysis at the levels of the Unit Action System and the S~cial 
Action System. A definition of social conflict is suggested and the 
process of conflict itself is explained. 
CHAPTER V deals with an o~tline of a general theory of social conflict 






(1) A COMMON LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION 
The distinction made between methodological and theoretical 
problems is intentional. Although both problematics imply theore-
tical activity~ it is maintained that sociologists do not have their 
'own' methodology in contrast to other sciences. Sociologists may 
be confronted in some cases with methodological problems arising from 
their particular field of inquiry (although even this is disputed by 
Nagel (1968) who asserts that the same logical canons are applicable 
to those sociologists who propose a subjective logic of inquiry and 
justification). However, the fact that certain methodological problems 
are encountered does not necessitate a claim for a separate logic of 
justification (S) or a non-scientific method of inquiry. (Non-Scien-
tific implying methods \llhich do not have recourse to logical canons 
inherent in scientific formulations.) Method or methodology of a 
science is according to Rudner (1966, p. 5): 
... the rationale on which it bases its acceptance or 
rejection of hypothesis or theories. 
5. The logic of justification refers to the logic of scientific in-
quiry, the rationale on which it bases its acceptance or rejection 
of theories, hypotheses, etc. In this study the logic of justi-
fication and the logic of validation are used interchangeably. 
In the arguments relating to methodological separatism it is im-
portant not to confuse the context of justification with the con-
text of discovery (that area of empirical inquiry). We do not 
infer from the context of empirical inquiry a thesis relating to 
the logic whereby a theory or hypothesis is accepted or rejected. 
The validational logic relating to a theory is independent of a 




To say that all sciences share a common logic of justification 
is to make the claim that sociology shares the applicability to its 
discipline the logic inherent in scientific formulations. In other 
words to place sociology in the scientific methodological court of 
appeal, where methodology is defined according to van Zyl Slabbert 
(1973. p. 6): 
•.• as that area of study which has as its primary aim in-
quiry into the logic of scientific formulations. 
Methodology defined in ~his way has particular relevance to theory 
construction and concept formation, the adequacy of which rests on the 
criteria of description, explanqtion and prediction. .Therefore, \vhen. 
the phenomenon of social conflict is being examined with a view to the 
development of a theory, it is subJect to a conunon logic of justifica-
tion inherent in scientific formulations. Further, the adequacy of 
such a theory rests on its descriptive, explanatory and predictive power. 
The problems related to theory construction are discussed in terms 
of the claims made for partial formalization. 
(2) PARTIAL FORMALIZATION 
Assuming the importance of theoretical abstraction for theoretical 
activity, theory is seen to be a vital component of scientific knowledge. 
Without theory descriptions become arbitrary points of discussion, the 
possibility of adequate explanation is reduced and without adequate 
explanation, prediction becomes difficult. 
The purpose of a theory of social conflict is to reduce the reign 
of arbitrary and piecemeal categories of description and prediction. 
If we agree that the aim of science is according to van Zyl Slabbert 
(1973, p. 9)' 
.•• the systematic accumulation of knowledge so that the 
occurrence of phenomena can be described, predicted and 
explained, 




Rudner (1966, p. 10) defines theory as: 
• •. a systematically related set of statements, 
including some law-like generalizations, that is 
empirically testable. 
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The difficulties with regard to the development of a scientific theory 
of social conflict relate to the criteria necessary for systematization, 
law-like generalization, and propositions that admit of empirical test-
ability. 
(i) Systematization refers to the necessity of logical integration 
of the concepts and propositions in a theory. It is an 
ideal of science to connect together in logical relations 
the concepts and propositions embodying whatever knowledge 
is acquired. Parsons (1965, p. 32) suggests; 
The ideal ..• is a system of propositions so 
related that their logical interdedendence is 
complete, so that all the propositions in the 
system can be rigorously derived from a set of 
primary postulates and definitions. 
Full formalization in theory of social conflict is an ideal. 
If this is applied as a necessary criterion the attempts at 
theory construction will be severely inhibited. Rudner 
(1966, p. 11) suggests that partial formalization is a 
legimate goal: 
In practice, to be sure, only a few theories 
achieve full formalization (i.e., are formulated 
as completely articulated deductive systems) and, 
indeed, there are reasons that cast doubt on 
whether attempts at full formulation need always 
be good strategy, particularly in those sciences 
where our knowledge is relatively tentative and 
restricted and where our uncertainty about the 
precise meaning and 'centrality' of frequently 
used concepts is marked. The overwhelming majo-
rity of exant scientific theories in the social 
sciences are not at present susceptatle of fruit-




(ii) Law-like generalization is not to be confused with a naive 
form of deterministic laws. The logically incoherent 
assumption of randomly distributed concepts must be 
replaced with the view that for the purposes of explanation 
of social conflict,generalizations are organized in such 
a way as to assume that under certain necessary conditions 
the tendency for the occurrence of social conflict can be 
characterized by law-like generalizations. This in no 
way implies the reduction of social conflict to determinis-
tic laws. Rudner (1966, pp. 90-91) suggests that: 
Perhaps the most important source of confusion 
attending the use of 'deterministic' has been the 
failure to recognize that to call a theory deter-
ministic is to say something about that theory's 
logical properties, broadly speaking, but nothing 
whatever about that theory's truth ---and hence 
nothing whatever about its degree of certitude. 
The quest for systematic explanation requires that in-
quiry be directed to relations of dependence between things 
Law-like generalizations therefore consist of a formulation 
of the conditions under which events occur, by ascertain-
ing the repeatable patterns or relations of dependence in 
which these events stand to one another. 
The constructipn of law-like generalizations relates to predic-
tion. Science is not based on the premise that perfect prediction is 
possible only that law-like generalizations have predictive power if 
events are related together and, that if certain necessary conditions 
are present, it is possible to make predictions with regard to the 
occurrence of a particular phenomenon such as social conflict. 
At this point it is clear that systematic organization and law-
like generalizations are necessary to the aims of science --- des-
cription, explantion and prediction. If social conflict is to be 
studied within the framework of science, systematization and the con-
struction of law-like generalizations are then important to a scienti-
fic theory of social conflict. 
• 
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(iii) Empirical testability refers gener'ally to the principle of 
operationalism. To what extent do we employ this prin-
ciple with regard to our concepts and propositions in 
such a way as to meet traditional empiricist demands for 
testability? Rudner (1966, p. 21) suggests: 
.•• that one way of meeting the demand of 
empirical testability on any candidate con-
cept that we are considering introducing 
into a theory is to introduce it through de-
finition by primitives which, themselves, are 
known to have empirically testable refe-
rence. Thus, an important by-product of the 
experimental .testability criterion for a set 
of primitives lies in the fact that any set 
that meets this condition in a theory guaran-
tees that all new concepts introduced through 
definition will, in turn, be experimentally 
testable con.cepts. 
Rudner however, concludes that scientists and philoso-
phers of science have come to realise that the unqualified 
fulfillment of this requirement is immensely difficult, 
perhaps impossible. Therefore insistence on its ful-
fillment for the validation of theory may be an unjus-
tifiab le demand. The modification of this demand 
rather can take the form of a demand for clarity es-
pecially in social science where partial formalization 
of theories necessitates a modification of the criterion 
of empirical testability. 
In developing a theory af social conflict the cri-
terion of clarity will be applied but it is not assumed 
that it is necessary to couch concepts and propositions 
at the primitive level in observationable terms. 
It seem reasonable to suggest that the demands f~ 
scientific explanation be applied with some degree of 
liberalism. This does not imply that a commitment to 
a corr~on logic of justification is forfeited or that the 
recognition with regard to the difficulties of full 
• 
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formalization be viewed in such a way as to absolve this study from 
its commitment to inquiry inherent in scientific formulations. 
The following discussion serves the purpose of clarifying pro-
blems which confront sociologists who choose to be placed in the 
scientific methodological court of appeal. The reproductive fallacy 
and the position ,of methodological separatism will be briefly ex-
amined. 
(3) REPRODUCTIVE FALLACY 
A claim that accepts the possibility of explanation but main-
tains that the only valid explanation of social conflict is one 
that 'captures' the experience of conflict in a particular situation, 
indicates a misconception with regard to the nature and function of 
scientific explanation. This is termed the reproductive fallacy which 
rests on the assumption that science must function to 'reproduce' 
reality. Rudner (1966, p. 83) maintains: 
The claim that the only understanding appropriate to 
social science is one that consists of a reproduction 
of the conditions or states of affairs being studied, 
is logically the same as the claim that the only 
understanding appropriate to the investigation of 
tornadoes is that gained in the direct experience of 
tornadoes. 
A description of the phenomenon of social conflict does not fail 
to be adequate on account of its abstraction. Abstraction and concep-
tualization are inherent in the nature of human language and expe-
rience (as asserted in Chapter 1) . Concepts describing a phenomenon 
are not deemed to be coextensive with the phenomenon as occurring 
in the empirical world. It is not necessary to deny that some sort 
of knowledge is gained by experiencing a particular phenomenon (for 
example the labour strikes in Zululand). However, this does not 
imply that a direct experience of social conflict is the only possible 
method of explanation or that ~direct experience is a substitute for 
a theoretical explanation of social conflict. In other words there 
is no a priori reason to believe that 'raw experience' constitutes a 




Sociologists do not claim that to describe and explain social 
conflict is to be social conflict itself. (Einstein has said that 
to describe the taste of the soup is not to be the soup) 
Abstraction li1 contrast to coextension is inherent in the nature 
of scientific formulations (and the nature of human experience). The 
claim for coextension can easily be interpreted as a disguised claim 
for empiricism. To deny the validity of abstraction is to remove 
sociology from the realm of scientific activity --- theoretical practice. 
Theoretical practice rests on the premise that abstractions (the raw 
material of science) are 'worked on' in such a way as to develop theo-
ries related to the phenomenon of social reality. 
Abstraction does not entail reproduction. Opposed to the attitude 
that scientific concepts and their relation to reality are mere 'fictions,' 
it is maintained that at least some of the general concepts related to 
the phenomenon of social conflict represent an adequate grasp of the 
concrete phenomenon. Parsons (1968, p. 730, Vol. II) makes a plea for 
analytical realism.with regard to abstraction; 
There is no implication that the value of any one such ele-
ment, or even of all those included in one logically cohe-
rent system, is completely descriptive of any particular 
concrete thing or event. 
Another implication of the reproductive fallacy is that prediction 
is impossible. For prediction to be a possibility we would have to be able 
to repz·oduce events. No science can reproduce an event, prediction 
refers only to the likelihood that a particular event will occur under 
a specific set of circumstances. Therefore in order to predict the 
possibility of social conflict we do not reproduce a set of circumstances 
from which social conflict occurs. Reproduction being impossible the 
likelihood of this type of prediction is nil. 
(4) M~ETHODOLOGICAL SEPARATISM: 
Apart from the erroneous claims that the phenomenon of social con-
flict cannot be examined because theoretical activity is not legitimate, 
• 
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or that the only valid explanation constitutes a reproduction of 
social reality, there is another position. This is termed methodo-
logical separatism and relates to claims that (while recognizing 
certain general canons of the scientific method) assert that a diffe-
rent or separate logic of justification is required because the 'logic 
of inquiry' of social reality differs from that of physical reality. 
The following claims will be briefly examined: 
I 
(i) that claim that rests on a confusion between 'methodo-
logy' and 'techniques'. 
(ii) that claim that rests on the assQ~ption that social rea-
lity is more complex and more unique and therefore requires 
a different logic of explanation. 
(iii) that claim that rests on the assumption that the defining 
characteristic of social reality is 'subjectivity' and 
therefore social reality requires a different logic of 
justification. 
(i) The claim that the social sciences require a radically 
distinct methodology different from that required in 
other sciences is often the result of a confusion 
between 'methodology' and 'technique'. To be sure 
the phenomenon of social conflict may require diffe-
rent techniques of investigation, but Rudner (1966, 
p. 5) maintains: 
In general, to become aware that various scienti-
fic disciplines employ differing techniques of 
investigation is not to become aware of anything 
significant about the nature of social science ... 
To claim that there is a difference in methodology 
is by contrast, to make a very radical claim. 
For the methodology of a scientific discipline is 
not a matter of its transient techniques but of 
its logic of justification ... Accordingly to 
hold that the social sciences are methodologically 
distinct from the non-social sciences is to hold not 
merely (or perhaps not at all) the banal view that 
the ~ocial sciences require a different logic of 
, - 17 -
inquiry .•. to deny that all of science is 
• characterized by a common logic of justi-
fication in its acceptance or rejection of 
hypotheses or theories. 
4• 
(ii) That social reality is more complex or social pheno-
mena more 'unique' than non-social phenomena is seen 
to be a rationale for a different methodology in the 
social sciences. The argument of complexity is dis-
missed on the grounds that science does not aim at 
reproduction of events or at 'capturing' the com-
plexity of events in their entirety. Further there 
is no reason to believe that physical reality is 
less complex. 
The important point to note is that we cannot infer from empi-
rical evidence (the context of discovery) a thesis in the context of 
justification. The extent to which social reality is complex or 
even unique, and that problems arise with regard to the analysis of 
certain empirical phenomena relate to the empirical questions with 
which sociology deals in its inquiry. Therefore, when examining the 
phenomenon of conflict we do not infer from empirical evidence a thesis 
in the context of justification. The thesis that social reality is 
more complex than physical reality would have to be validated. 
Science it is argued (and correctly) is capable of systematization 
only by generalization. Social reality because it consists of 'unique' 
phenomena cannot be grasped by the scientific method. However, logi-
cally, any entity is unique in the sense of being different. The aim 
of inquiry into social conflict is to grasp adequately, repeatable pat-
terns present in social reality which if theoretically systematized 
yield an adequate explanation. The question of 'uniqueness' of social 
conflict (whether true or not) does not relate to the logic of justi-
fication and explanation of social conflict. 
(iii) A position of methodological separatism that has received 
serious attention is one that maintains that the only 
valid 'logic of inquiry' for the sociologist is one that 





This method is termed 'understanding' or 'empathy.' 
l.eaving aside the problems related to the exact meaning 
of these terms the following points will be discussed: 
(a) Reproductive Fallacy? 
(b) Is subjective 'understanding' the only possible 
method in sociology? 
(c) Is the subjective method validational? 
Schutz appears to be guilty of the reproductive fallacy. 
Schutz (1960, p. 214) has said: 
Summing up, we come to the conclusion that social 
things are only understandable if they can be re-
duced to human activities, and, human activities 
are only made understandable by showing their in-
order-to or because motives. The deeper reason 
for this fact is that as I naively live within the 
social world I am able to understand other people's 
acts only if I can imagine that I myself would per-
form analogous acts if I were in the same situation, 
directed by the same because motives, or oriented 
by the same in-order-to motives. 
Schutz maintains that unless we know these motives and at 
the same time are able to identify ourselves with the 
human actor we will not !understand' behaviour. For 
him the fallacy of behaviourism and other forms of 
objectivism consists in the substitution of a 'fictional 
world' for social reality. Winch (1958) similarly argues 
that social behaviour is rule governed and the appropriate 
knm'>'ledge would be gained by 11 coming to learn the rules." 
Therefore the social scientist must be able to know the 
experience of behaving in conformity with the rules. 
The argument again seems to demand that the social scientist be 
able to 'reproduce' reality. We must be able to be the phenomenon 
under study. (How may it be possible to be the social conflict under 
study?) In the study of social conflict it is strongly asserted that 
the aim is not to reproduce social reality! This argument has previously 
been dismissed. 
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(b) Nagel (1968, p. 35) suggests that the distinctions 
required for examining social reality are not exclu-
sively subjective. It is beyond doubt that human 
behaviour is characterized by subjective elements ---
human behaviour is characterized by purposive and moti-
vational elements . However, we are not confined to 
. distinctions that relate exclusively to psychological 
states. 
In the study of social conflict a premium is placed on observable 
aspects of behaviour, because overt behaviour constitutes a more adequate 
basis for study than an introspective analysis of because or in-order-to 
motives. No claim is made that observation of such overt behaviour is 
the only source of information anyone has concerning the experience and 
actions of human actors. It is not inconsistent to maintain that there 
are such things as private psychic states but that overt behaviour con-
stitutes the most important source of knowledge of individual and social 
action with regard to the study of social conflict. 
(c) Related to (b) it is important here that the issue is not 
whether nputting oneself in the place of" is a technique 
for discovering the subjective character of human action. 
The question to be answered is whether this 'understanding' 
is a validational method, a basis for accepting or reject-
ing a hypothesis or proposition. If this is so then we 
would be able to say that 'subjective' (in contfast to 
scientific) explanation is constituted by its own logic 
of justification. 
Rudner (1966, p. 73) suggests that we do not argue against 'empat~y' 
or 'understanding' or discard it as a validationa1 step,' 
... but clearly, in order to accept some specific empathetic 
act as validational, we must presuppose an investigation 
establishing that this act is veridical~ · 
• 
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This implies that some means are available, independent of empathy 
for establishing that the empathy is sufficiently like the state 
of which it is in empathy. Rudner argues that the very logic of the 
methodological employment of empathy precludes its indispensability 
as a methodological device in the social sciences by guaranteeing that 
there is an independent means "for validating the hypothesis its use 
is intended to validate." 
CONCLUSION 
With regard to the study of social con~lict it is maintained that 
15 
the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses ~ characterized by a common 
logic of justification inherent in scientific formulations. That this 
logic relates to 'objective' factors in the sense of overt behaviour is 
not inconsistent with the claim that subjective factors are important 
with regard to the phenomenon of social conflict. We do not however, 
infer from empirical fact a thesis in the context of validation. The 
logic of justification refers to the criterion of adequacy of description~ 
explanation,and prediction. Theoretical activity is not restricted by 
the demand for full formalization when attempting to develop a theory 
of social conflict. 
It is apparent that the methodological problems discussed in this 
chapter are relevant to sociological analysis in general. The problems 
however, are also extremely relevant to a study of social conflict~ In 
fact it is difficult to develop an explicit methodological position 
n 
adequate to the study of social conflict without comimg to terms with 
why it is valid and useful to accept the scientific methodological 






Theory construction is closely linked to the methodological 
principles a theorist adopts. To adopt certain methodological 
principles is to place theoretical activity before the criteria which 
determine the adequacy of a particular theory that is constructed. 
We cannot rest comfortably when once we have chosen the scientific 
methodological court of appeal. The adequacy of the theory is then 
determined by explicit criteria inherent in the logic of scientific 
formulations. 
The basic premises for the methodological position to be out-
lined in this chapter were discussed in Chapter II. The task of this 
chapter is to make explicit the methodological position and logic of 
explanation adopted with regard to the phenomenon of social conflict. 
It is hoped that the position adopted will be consistent with the 
theoretical position outlined in the forthcoming chapters. 
(1) THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY: 
,• 
Parsons (1965, p. 32) has said that the cons.~:'lsus with regard 
to the general canons of the scientific method: 
••• clearly includes the role of theory in science and 
the nature of conceptual schemes which scientific theory 
employs. 
Rex (1970) advocates the type of scientific approach which emphasizes 
the role of theoretical models. Another sociologist (1973, p. 9) 
has said that science aims at 
the systematic accumulation of knowledge so that 
the occurrence of phenomena can be described, predicted, 
and explained. 
Three points are evident: 
• 
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{i) That in order to explain the phenomenon of social conflict 
it is necessary to develop a theory of social conflict. 
Theory is a vital component of scientific knowledge: 
(ii) Therefore, in the study of social conflict we do not engage 
ourselves in a piecemeal collection of randomly organized or 
unrelated sets of ideas which lead no further than to spec-
lative confusion. In terms of the aims of science our task 
is that of a systematic accumulation of knowledge. As discuss-
ed in Chapter II, it is not inadmissable to make the plea 
for partial formalization or for liberalism with regard to 
the logical integration; This does not constitute a recog-
nition of formlessness or a claim for a 'separate' methodology 
The claim for a common logic of justification remains. 
(iii) In order to systematize our knowledge and develop a general 
theory of social· conflict it is necessary to make analytical 
abstractions and generalizations. Science does not aim at 
the reconstruction of social reality; it is a highly selective 
mode of organizing our knowledge. In the study of social 
conflict we cannot give analytical content to everything empiri-
cally knowable about the phenomenon of soci2l conf~ict. 
Parsons (1965, p. 32) has said that sociologists: 
... cannot possibly embrace everything empirically 
knowable about the concrete phenomena at hand. 
They must select, ie., abstract, according to their own 
criteria of relevance to theoretical problems. 
Opposed to the view that scientific concepts in their relation 
to reality constitute 'useful fictions,' it is maintained that 
at least some of the general concepts of science adequately 
grasp aspects of the objective external world. Parsons' plea 
for analytical realism is admissable. 
'lliEORY AS "SYSTEM' 
In the theoretical study of social conflict another important 
point must be discussed. 
• 
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It has been stated that the aim of science is the systematic accumu-
lation of knowledge, that science is a highly selective mode of orga-
nizing our knowledge. Given that theory is a vital component of 
scientific knowleige,the criteria for its adequacy imply a body of 
systematically related set of statements that are logically integrated. 
With regard to the theory of social conflict the concept of system is 
an application of the criteria of logical integration. (This does 
not imply a restr·ictive claim for logical closure. The claim in other 
words does not demand complete deductive formulation of the system, but 
some degree of logical integration.) · 
It is assumed that social reality exhibits certain patterns of 
interdependence (the extent of this interdependence is of course, an 
empirical question, subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by 
empirical evidence,) Parsons (1965, p. 32) suggests: 
Systematization of theory clearly implies the concept 
of empirical system as its counterpart •.. If a theory 
is to be empirically relevant, it must present demon-
strably verifiable patterns of interdependence among 
empirical phenomena. In order to do this, however, 
it must delineate and classify phenomena according to 
criteria of relevance and importance. An empirical 
system, then, is a body of presumptively interdependent · 
phenomena to which a given abstract analytical schema 
is relevant. It is impossible to study everything at 
once empirically. An empirical system is a theoreti-
cally defined field of relevant phenomena, with reference 
to which certain problem-statements have been abstracted. 
With regard to explanation of social conflict the aspect of sys-
tematic interrelatedness both theoretically and empirically will be 
taken as a point of departure. This aspect satisfies the criteria 
of logical integration in theoretical formulations, and importantly, 
represents the principle on which the logic of explanation of social 
conflict is based --the logi'c of the dialectic. The notion of system 
implies the concept of structure that is, a way of ordering the uni-
versum of events. A theory of social conflict thus implies a sys-
tematic interrelation of concepts and propositions with some degree 
of logical integration which implies a structural ordering of empirical 
events. 
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(2) A STRUCTURAL - FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: 
Before looking at the logic of the dialectical method there 
are certain methodological premises which if accepted serv~ as the 
basis from which it becomes possible to employ the logic of the 
dialectic. 
The question that must be answered is ---how is it logically 
possible to give an explanation of social conflict? The term 
social conflict (at this point still undefined) conjures up a 
preliminary notion of some sort of dynamic process. The approach 
to the notion of conflict as involving process is termed the 
Structural-Functional approach. 
To say that it is impossible to give explanation to the 
dynamics of social conflict on the grounds that we cannot re-
duce 'dynamics' to 'static' scientific categories (or structures), 
is to deny the possibility of scientific explanation. Science 
rests on the assumption not only that it is in principle possible 
to explain the dynamics of a particular aspect of social reality, 
but that it is the task of science to do so. The aims of science 
are not limited to structural morphology or classification. 
Science itself is a dynamic process, not a static cumulation of 
knowledge but a dynamic, changing and even a revolutionizing process 
which makes possible the growth of knowledge. (6) 
6. Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1970) maintains that science develops by revolu-




The dynamics of social conflict are not 'reduced' to structural 
categories. However, logically, any explanation of social conflict 
entails an identification of the phenomena which constitute social 
conflict. These phenomena are conceptually defined as the structures 
of social conflict. Parsons (1965, p. 70) maintains that: 
The categorical assertion that any assumptions about struc-
ture are scientifically inadmissable, because in the last 
analysis everything is in flux, denies the legitimacy of 
science. In any scie'nce, and in sociology in particular, 
the concept of change (or as in this study the process of 
social conflict) is meaningful only in terms of a defineable 
something, i.e., something which can be described in struc-
tural terms. (My insertion) . 
The assumption of structure does not refer to a metaphysical belief 
of ontological stability of the phenomena in the social world. The 
notion of social conflict as a dynamic process would make pure nonsense 
in terms of this belief. The assumption that social reality exhibits 
certain patterns of interdependence is sufficient to maintain that 
the notion of structure is a workable pragmatic assumption. 
(1969, p. 122) suggests that 
Dahrendorf 
... processes are accessible to our analysis only, if we 
dissect them into their static elements; more precisely, 
if we try to reconstruct them from a static basis (which 
changes) and from certain forces (which cause change). 
Once the structure of a system is seen as a positive constituent 
of dynamic analysis there must be some way of linking the structu~al 
categories to the dynamically variable elements. in the system. This 
link is supplied by the concept function,. When we say that a structure 
functions in a particular way, we are saying that function is the pro-
cess by which a particular structure either transforms, develops 0r 
simply speaking is in motion.' · Dahrendorf (1969, p. 123) suggests that: 
There are in other words, within social structures certain 
elements or forces which are at the same time their con-
stituent parts (and therefore 11 function" within them) and 
impulses operating towards their supersedence and change. 
The category 'structure' and the category 'function' are therefore closely 
linked. 
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Goldmann (1969, p. 14) maintains that the disjQnction of the 
ideas of structure and function promote methodological principles 
which seem to him to confirm the methodological denial of any his-
torical dimension to social facts: 
..• if one separates structure from function, he 
has already committed himself to the creation of 
either &i ahistorical and formalistic structuralism 
O"r""afunctionalism with the same orientation. 
The link therefore between structure and function constitutes a dyna-
mic historical approach to the study of social conflict. 
(3) THE DIALECTIC: 
The logic of the dialectic: 
In sociology there is much confusion as to the precise 
meaning of the dialectic. Schneider (19'11, pp. 667-678) 
suggests that the dialectic need not be tied to any particular 
philosophy of history or world view. This study takes as a 
point of departure Marx 1 s formulation of the dialectic. The 
debate as to the truth of falsity of :Marx 1 s approach is not at 
issue in this study. The dialectic is adopted as a heuristic 
device for the purposes of a theoretical explanation of social 
conflict. 
The logic of the dialectic is premised on the concept of 
interrelation both theoretically and empirically. The concept 
of system is a vital component of the dialectic. Further, the 
concept of system as constituted by a structure linked to the 
concept of function gives content to the second premise of the 
dialectic, that of a dynamic system. Following this is the 
third premise of the dialectic;,that the link between structure 
and function commits us to a historical view of social reality. 
For the purpose of clarity the particular formulation of the 





(i) The dialectic presupposes a theoretical 'system' which 
is conceived of as a logically interrelated body of con-
cepts and propositions. The theoretical system is con-
ceived of as a structural point of reference from which 
to formulate coherently a theory of social conflict. 
(ii) An empirical system is conceived of as a related counter-
part of the theoretical system. It is not assumed that 
the logical integration of an empirical system if an a 
priori true statement of fact. The extent of its in-
tegration is in part an empirical question subject to 
confirmation by empirical evidence. The empirical sys~ 
tem is also conceived of as a structural point of re-
ference from which it is possible to analyse social 
conflict. 
(iii) Th~ recognition of the theoretical and empirical sys-
•~ tern as structural points of reference is extended to 
the assumption of certain structurally given reference 
points within these systems. It is not logically 
possible to proceed with a dynamic a~alysis without de-




The explanatory power of the dialectic rests on the heu-
ristic device of structurally defined reference points with-
in a theoretical and empirical system. 
(v) For the purposes of dynamic analysis the dialectic logi-
cally relates the concept of functio~ to a particular 




(vi) The structure of a system is therefore intrinsically related 
to the functioning of its constituent parts and to the func-
tioning of the system taken as a whole. This means that the 
system as a whole is taken as a reference point for the expla-
nation of the relationship between structure and function but 
that the relationship can also be conceptualized analytically, 
in terms of a particular part of the system. This does not 
imply that the system as a whole is no longer a consistent 
point of reference but that certain constituent parts of the 
system can be taken as analytically separable points of refer-
ence. (7) 
(vii) It is necessary to adopt a methodological position consistent 
with this formulation of the dynamics of the system. This 
position is the Structural-Functional approach. 
(viii) The logic of the dialectic is thus a dynamic system of re-
lational logic which theoretically complies with the demand 
for logical integration and systematization. This logic is 
assumed to be operative if social reality is regarded as re-
lational, that is, consisting of an interrelationship between 
it's structure and it's functioning. 
The dialectic is a method capable of conceiving of the dynamics of 
social conflict. At this point the definition of social conflict 
clearly includ~d the notion of a process, involving an interrelation 
between the concepts structure and function. The problem which is 
now apparent is that of the application of the dialectic to the actual 
process of social conflict. This process relates to the concept of 
reconstitution which is incorporated in the logic of the dialectic. 
7. For example, Smelser (Theory of Collective Behaviour, Routledge 
& Kegai Paul Ltd., London, 1970) conceives of norm-oriented 
collective movements as related to the normative structural 
reference points within a particular systemic framework. For 
the purposes of analysis norm-oriented movements are analyti-
cally separable phenomena and their consequences can be ana-
lyzed in terms of the system taken as a whole or in terms of 
the systerr.'s constituent parts. 
... 
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Jhe dialectic and reconstitution: 
Social conflict then is preliminary defined as that pro-
cess involving a reconstitution of the structural components 
of a system. The concept reconstitution relates to a reor-
ganization of the components of a system. This reorganiza-
tion refers to the process of conflict (or the development of 
contradictions) between the components cf a system. (8) 
For the purposes of clarity the logic of the argument is 
outiined: 
(i) The internal relations (that is the relations between the 
structural components) are organized in such a way as to 
conceive of their reconstitution. The structural compo-
nents ftre related in a hierarchy of organization (explained 
in 'Note on the Dialectic'). 
(ii) By means of a dialectical (reciproc&l) interaction of the 
internal relations it is logically possible to conceive of 
the reconstitution of the system as a whole and of the re-
constitution only of some of its constituent parts. 
(iii) The structural components at the base of the hierarchy, the 
primary components are seen to be interrelated with the com-
ponents at the top of the hierarchy, the secondary compo-
nents. By means of a reciprocal inte!"action of the pri-
mary components with the secondary components and interaction 
within -the secondary components themselves, it is possible 
(iv) 
to conceive of two types or forms of contradictions. 
Principle contradictions related to the primary (base) com-
ponents of the hierarchy, in interaction with secondat;y com-
ponents are seen to cause a reconstitution of the relations 
in the system as a whole. 
8. Reconstitution as a process may not necessary refer to the deve-
lopment of conflict (or contradictions). In this study however, 




(v) Secondary contradictions also related to the primary and 
secondary components of the hierarchy,but are seen to cause 
a reconstitution of only parts of the relations in the system. 
(vi) Secondary contradictions related to the secondary components 
of the hierarchy are seen to cause a reconstitution of 
the components of the system which are related only to the 
secondary components of the hierarchy. 
(vii) Both principle and secondary contradictions therefore 
function causally in relation to the structural components 
of the system. 
(viii) The development of principle and secondary contradictions are 
not seen to become operative for the system in terms of a 
simple causal logic. The sufficient condition for a con-
tradiction (whether principle or secondary) to become opera-
'• tive is the combination of a complex set of conditions. (9) 
The conception of the dialectic as a system of relational logic 
based on the hierarchy of organization of internal relations within 
a system makes it logically possible then to conceive of 
(a) principle contradictions and, 
(b) secondary contradictions. 
The contradictions relate to the concept of reconstitution which is 
seen to be necessary in a theoretical explanation of social conflict. 
9. Piaget (1971, p. 126) observes that Louis Althusser stresses the 
complex development of contradictions inherent in Marx's formu-
lation of the dialectic. Thus for Marx an accumulation of a 
complex set of conditions is necessary for a contradiction to 
develop in a system. Similarly,Smelser (1970) ccnceives of the 
development of an incident of collective behaviour as the com-
bination of a number of conditions. 
i .• 
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(4) NOTE ON THE DIALECTIC: PRIMARY & SECONDARY COMPONENTS 
When discussing the structural hierarchy of organizion 
as constituted by primary and secondary components no mention 
was made of the reason for conceiving of the hierarchy in this 
way. 
It is important for the purposes of this study to clarify 
what is meant by this conception of the hierarchy. 
The social world contains both material (means of produc-
tion, physical environment) and ideal (normative) elements. 
In fact, it is not possible to conceive of the social world in 
any other way unless we adopt the scientifically untenable po-
sition that the social world consists only of material elements~ 
or alternatively,only of ideal elements. The position adopted 
in this study affirms the impossibility of adopting either of 
these latter positions. The material and ideal elements in 
their interaction produce social reality. 
However, the question may be asked--- why 'primary' and 
why 'secondary' components? Broadly speaking primary components 
refer to the material aspects of social reality and secondary 
components refer to those elements constituting the normative 
elements (values; political, religious, intellectual and juri-
dical ideas). The material world is conceived of as 'primary' 
-
on the grounds that the secondary elements ar3 'grounded on' the 
primary elements of the social world --- taking as. Marx did 
the premise that social-material existence precedes conscious-
ness. 
The recognition of the material elements as primary does not 
imply that they are to be studied without giving import to non-
material elements. There is a dialectical interrelationship 
between both these elements. The historical development of 
social reality is predicated on the indissoluble link between 
the ,material and the non-material elements of social reality, on 
.. __ the~.r dialectical interrelationship. This constitutes the theo-
retical and method~logical position of dialectical materialism. 
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That social reality is predicated on the interrelationship 
between the material and non-material elements refutes any claim 
of vulgar materialism. That weight is given to material conditions 
of social existence on the grounds that material conditions precede 
consciousness, does not imply that social existence precludes con-
sciousness (or non-material elements) . 
Goldmfu~n (1969, p. 62) maintains: 
There is nothing more curious than the lament con-
stantly reiterated by opponents of Marxism that it 
neglects the realm of ideas and the spiritual life. 
One of the basic theses of the Marxist method js 
that any serious study of human reality leads back 
to thought when its material aspect has been taken 
as the point of departure and to social and economic 
reality when one has begun with the history of ideas. 
c 
The notion of primary and se•ondary components serves as the 
departure point for this study's explanation of social conflict. 
The logic of the dialectic,as a system of relational logic which 
includes the notion of contradicticn,is seen to be applicable to 
the concept of social conflict as a process of 'reconstitution.' 
The structural-functional approach is seen as the methodological 
position from which to develop an explanation of social conflict. 
-
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. ' . . . 
(2) How is the process of reconstitution related to a VOluntaristic 
conception of social conflict, and, concerning the process of 
reconstitution itself, 
(3) what level of analysis is adequate for conceiving of social 
conflict in terms of its consequences for the system as a whole 
or of its parts, assuming that a system of action as a structu-
rally given reference point for the analysis of conflict is re-
quired? The reference points of the unit action system and the 
social action system are to be discussed. 
(4) Given a particular definition of social conflict, what are the 
determinants of social conflict? 
(1) THE VOLUNTARISTIC POSTULATE 
Both Parsons and Marx have seen the postulate of voluntarism as 
fundamental to human action. Generally speaking the concept 
refers to the assumption that human activity constitutes the 
motive force in the development of social reality. 
(1970, p. 78) quotes Marx: 
Bottomore 
History does nothing; ·it '.does not possess immense 
riche~' 'it does not fight battles.' It is men, 
real living men, who do all this, who possess things 
and fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses 
men as a means of achieving --- as if it were an indi-
vidual person--- its own ends. History is nothing 
but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends. 
The term action is used in such a way as to logically con-
ceive of human activity as-voluntaristic. A distinction is 
made between behaviour (a moth fluttering towards a candle 
flame) which is a response to a stimulus, and action which is 
conceived of as the process of human activity taking place 
within certain 'limits' constituted by normative and non-nor-
mative (material) elements. That action is vc luntaristic im-
plies that action involves certain elements: rationality, 
.. 
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subjective orientation, and 'effort,' and that action in con-
trast to behaviour, is not a simple mechanistically determined 
response to a particular stimulus. 
To say that human action is 'determined' by material con-
ditions (physical environment) denies that man is an active 
agent who has historically adapted to and transformed the 
material conditions of existence. The assumption that human 
action is purposive and involves rationality implies that man 
is continually 'acting on' the social and material environment 
to achieve certain ends (whether the ends be rational or non-
rational). If man is wholly 'determined' by material condi-
tions rationality and purposive action disappears, action in 
the relevant sense is eliminated and becomes a behavioural re-
sponse to a stimulus. The material conditions of existence 
become the sum of sensory stimuli impinging on the behavioural 
organism. 
The postulate of determinism denies that human action is 
oriented to ends where ends are conceived of as goals (values), 
and where orientation to ends is normatively regulated. 
Parsons empha~izes strongly that action involves normative or 
evaluative elements. To accept a materialist determinism is 
to eliminate from empirical relevance the role of normative 
elements which characterize the subjective orientation of 
VOL. I. 
human action. Parsons (1968, pp. 81-32) maintains: 
Positively a voluntaristic system involves elements 
of a normative character. Radical positivism eli-
minates all such elements completely from empirical 
relevance. A utilitarian system admits them but 
only in the status of random ends which are thus only 
data for the empirical application of the theoretical 
system. In the voluntaristic theory they become 
interdependent with the other elements in specifically 
determinate ways. 
On the other hand, if human action is said to be 'determined' 
by normative elements, action then becomes an emanation of ideal 
\ICL. I.. 




In an idealistic theory 'action' becomes a process 
of "emanation," of "self expression11 of ideal or 
normative factors. 
Parsons maintains that a voluntaristic system is predicated on 
the interdependence of the normative and non-ncrmati ve elements. 
Although Parsons has said that non-normative elements play 
an important role he has been criticized for his emphasis on 
normative elements. Hoodie (1972, p. 2) suggests that this 
leads him to a position of "static value determinism. 11 Following 
Weber's thesis on the influence of Protestantism on the rise of 
Capitalism, Parsons tends to stress the independent causal signi-
finance of value elements in social action. While it is im-
portant to emphasize the 'active' role of values in action it is 
1 
not admissable to imply ,that action takes place independently of 
the material conditions of existence. This would come to the 
same thing as seeing action as the process of emanation of nor-
mative elements. (Idealism.) To see ends (values, goals) as 
rooted in conditions ,and· norms capable of being altered in con-
formity with the material conditions and facilities or means 
available to the actor, is not to deny the powerful force that 
normative elements have in human action. 
In this study the relationship between the normative and 
non-normative elements is seen as dialectical. Neither of the 
elements are conceived of as epiphenomena. If we attribute in-
dependent causal significance to normative elements we fall into 
the scientifically untenable position, idealism. If we attribute 
independent causal significance to material elements, we fall into , 
the equally untenable position, materialism. 
the voluntaristic character of human action. 
In short, we deny 
The position adopted in the previous chapter, dialectical 
materialism, rests on the premise that action consists of an 
interrelationship between the material and normative elements. 
The fact that weight is given to material elements as primary 
components of social action does not in the least deny the 
• 
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interrelationship between the material and normative elements. 
That normative elements are 'secondary'components of action does 
not therefore imply that they are less fundamental, or as pre-
viously mentioned, without causal significance. Neither does 
dialectical materialism imply a vulgar materialist determinism. 
Marx strongly criticized the eighteenth-century French materialists 
for leaving the human element out of their accounts of the in-
fluence of material conditions. Me Lellan (1972, p. 124) quotes 
Marx: 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of 
circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances 
are changed by man and the educator must himself be 
educated. 
The central idea of dialectical materialism is that the key 
to understanding human action is to be found in the way men and 
women produce their means of existence and that the forms of 
social relations (political, religious, juridical) are inter-
dependent with the particular form of material production. 
Me Lellan (1972, p. 123) takes an example --the rights of man 
as proclaimed in the French Revolution and the first constitu-
tion of the United States were not 
... eternal truths about the nature of man that hap-
pened to be discovered at that particular time; 
they could only be fully understood if viewed in 
the context of demands by new commercial groups for the 
end of feudal . restrictions and for free competi-
tion in economic affairs. 
It has been mentioned that human action takes place within 
'limits' constituted by material and normative elements. This 
appears to refute the voluntaristic character of human action. 
However, the recognition that human action is not 'free-floating' 
indicates that it takes place within a defined set of conditions 
but which do not render action impossible. If the voluntaristic 
conception is to be upheld then the problem of how action takes 
place must be solved. Parsons (1968, p. 719) suggests the use 
of the term "effort11 which he sees as having analytical status 
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analogous to that of energy in physics. The normative and 
material elements become 'activated' through the effort of 
action itself (involving motivation towards the gratification 
of needs, the appropriation of means available to facilitate 
the end or goal, normative orientation between the means and the 
end). Parsons says courses of action are "open" within the 
limits prescribed by the conditional elements of social reality. 
Similarly, Marx's conception of praxis (human activity) accord-
ing to Lefebvre (1968) indicates that praxis is "open," but 
according to f4arx, quoted in t-ic Lellan (1973, p. 123), human 
action 
is itself conditioned by the circumstances in 
which men find themselves, by the productive forces 
already acquired, by the social form which exists 
before they do, which they do not create, which is 
the product of the preceding generation. 
In other words (Marx in Me Lellan (1972,pp. 129), 
circumstances make men just as much as men make 
circumstances. 
Voluntarism implies that action is possible within certain con-
ditional limits. If the voluntaristic conception is denied on 
the grounds that men and women act independently of the limits, 
material and normative, of social reality, then we have to make 
the scientifically untenable admission that man is 'free-floating.! 
In short, that action takes place in a realm which is independent 
of social reality. 
The voluntarastic conception of social conflict as a form of 
action assumes: 
(i) that social conflict involves rationality, subjective 
orientation ~d 'effort' and therefore: 
(ii) that social ·conflict is not a mechanistic response 
to a particular stimulws; 
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(iii) that social conflict takes place within the limits set 
~ by both material and normative elements of social reality 
and therefore, that: 
(iv) the process of social conflict involves an interrelation of 
both these elements in terms of the principle of dialectical 
materialism. 
(2) RECONSTITUTION 
Given these assumptions, social conflict (as preliminary 
defined) refers to the process of action which involves recon-
constitution. In other words, the f1mctioning of the structu-
ral components of social action is defined in terms of the con-
cept of reconstitution. In Chapter III this process was con-
ceived of as the dynamic interrelationship of the primary (material) 
and secondary (normative) components, according to the principle 
of hierarchical organization. This principle includes the position 
of dialectical materialism which in terms of the voluntaristic 
postulate positively interrelates the primary and secondary compo-
nents. If the process of reconstitution is to be systematized 
in order to develop an explanation of social conflict, it is fun-
damentally important to give clarity to the concepts primary and 
secondary components. How can they be defined so as to be useful 
for explanatory purposes? 
The traditional empiricist demand for observational terms 
which have a direct empirically testable reference imposes a 
restriction on the concepts to be admitted in an explanation. 
Attempts at systematization cannot proceed by dispensing with non-
observational terms. Further, it is not an imperative that all 
theoretical concepts be couched in observational terms of reference 
particularly in the social sciences where it is legimate to plea 
for •partial formalization in concept formation and theory con-
struction. Therefore the traditional empiricist demand of 
empirical testability is modified to the criterion of clarity. 
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The validity of an explanation does in the last analysis rest on 
its empirical application and testability if the theorist is 
committed to a scientific explanation. However, the development 
of a theoretically systematic explanation of social conflict is 
not inhibited by restrictive empiricist demands. 
Tne ?Ormative components of action concern the values, beliefs, 
goals, and norms, sanctions, which actors utilize in their action 
and interaction. Values are the most general statements of legi-
timate ends (goals) which guide action. Values constitute a 
system of beliefs which give definition to action and the goals of 
action. Religions, political~ philosophical and juridical values 
are some of the patterns of belief and ideas which guide action. 
Norms are more specific than general values and are the regula-
tory, culturally defined sanctions governing the pursuit of goals 
and actions. Values and norms constitute the normative limits 
within which action takes place. 
During the process of social conflict if these elements are 
activated in relation to the material components of action, the 
process of reconstitution becomes operative for the internal re-
lations of the system as a whole. This constitutes a principle 
contradiction. The normative elements in interrelation with the 
material components may also give rise to a process of reconstitu-
tion which does not have consequences for the system as a whole but 
only for the relations of parts of the system. This constitutes 
a secondary contradiction. The normative components in their 
interrelation with each other can also give rise to a secondary con-
tradiction which has consequences only for the relations between the 
normative components. 
The material components concern the facilities, the means of 
production, and aspects of the physical environment which actors 
utilize (in relationship with the normative components) in their 
action and interaction. Facilities refer to the available skills 
which are utilized as a means for the attainment of a particular 
goal (end) of action. Facilities are incorporated in the means of 
production constituted by the productive forces and productive mode of 
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activity which actors utilize to produce their means of exis-
tence and to attain goals related to their production. The 
environment is comprised of the physical aspects of the natural 
world which are utilized as facilities in the production of the 
actors' existence. Empirically the environment is also consti-
tuted by the forms of social and cultural relations developed by 
actors as a means for the attainment of particular ends (for 
example, the family). Therefore when action takes place the en-
vironment is constituted by both the physical and socio-cultural 
aspects of reality,but for logical reasons the physical environ-
ment constitutes an element of the material components of action. 
The facilities, the means of production and, the physical envi-
ronment constitute (analytically) the material limits within which 
action takes place. 
During the process of social conflict if these elements are 
activated in relation to the normative components of action, the 
process of reconstitution becomes operative for the internal re-
lations of the system as a whole. This constitutes a principle 
contradiction. However, the material elements in their inter-
relation with some of the elements of the normative components 
may also give rise to a process of reconstitution which does not 
have consequences for the system as a whole but only for parts 
of the relations of the system. This constitutes a secondary 
contradiction. Interrelation between the material elements 
themselves are not seen to be constitutive of relations of social 
conflict. TI1e development of facilities or the means of pro-
ductive only in relation to the normative components can be acti-
vated to give rise to a process of reconstitution in the system. 
It is important to emphasize that the distinction made between 
the primary and the secondary components is a logical one in terms 
of the premises of dialectical materialism. Empirically these 
components are not conceived of as separate elements of social 
reality. The normative and material components can 'be defined as 
analytically separate categories. During the process of recon·· 




Neither are the components static descripti~; categories. 
If this was the case, the explanation of social conflict would 
represent a mere formalistic structuralism which denies the con-
ception of social conflict as a dynamic process. The. approach 
in this study has been termed the structural-functional approach 
which conceives of the dynamic functioning of the structural com- · 
pone!s in terms of the premises of dialectical materialism. 
Having defined the material and normative components and their 
interaction during the process of reconstitution it is now possible 
to take a closer look at reconstitution. Three significant points 
were made: 
(i) The secondary (normative) components in their interrelation 
with the primary (material) give rise to a process of recon-
stitution of the system as a whole (principle contradiction) 
(ii) or, give rise to a process of reconstitution of parts of the 
relations of the system (secondary contradiction). 
(iii) The secondary components in their interrelation with each 
other give rise to a process of reconstitution which has 
consequences for the relations of parts of the system 
(secondary contradiction). 
In Chapter III the dialectic and reconstitution was discussed 
and it was stated that by means of a dialectical (reciprocal) inter-
action of the internal relations of the system, it is possible to 
conceive of a reconstitution of the system a~ a whole and of a 
reconstitution only of some of its constituent parts. 
The concept fusion is used to illustrate the interrelation of 
the components during the process of social conflict. The com-
ponents or some of their elements fuse into a rupt ural unit which 
indicates a disynchronization (a rupture) between the relations in 
the system. Conceived of in this way, the process of reconstitu-
tion refers to the ruptural function of particular relations between 
the components in the system. In other words when t~e process of 
• 
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reconstitution becomes operative in the system, the interaction 
between the components has the function of bringing about a 
rupture in the system which has consequences for the reconsti-
tution of the relations in the system. The process of reconsti·· 
tution .in terms of principle and secondary contradictions will 
now be discussed and illustrated with examples. 
By means of a reciprocal interaction of the primary com-
ponents with the secondary components the relations of the 
system as a t'lhole are reconstituted. This was referred to as 
a principle contradiction. The relations between the secondary 
components and the primary components are seen as disynchronous 
and the process of reconstitution necessarilr involves a recon-
stitution of the elements of the material components and of the 
elements of the normative components of action. This process 
of reconstitution indicates a complex ruptural unity of all the 
components of the system. It is therefore not a simple con-
tradiction between the primary and secondary components. If the 
principle contradiction is to become active in the strongest 
sense, to become a ruptural principle, there must be an accumulation 
of conditions that fuse the primary and secondary components into 
a ruptural unit which indicates a disynchronous relationship between 
the normative and material components of action. 
The notion of a ruptural principle is used to indicate the 
disynchronization of the relations in the system as a whole during 
the process of reconstitution in which a principle contradiction 
is operative. This contradiction is constituted (as stated) by a 
complex accumulation of conditions which make it possible to con-
ceive of the disynchronization between the primary and secondary 
components as becoming operative for the reconstitution of the 
relations in the system as a whole. 
The Russian Revolution. (1917) is an example of a principle 
contradiction. An accumulation of forces during the period of 
1861 (the e~nancipation of serfs) to 1917 led to a disynchronization 
between ·the structural components of Russian society. 
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The final outbreak of conflict (the interrelation of the com-
ponents in a ruptural principle) in 1917 had consequences for 
the reconstitution of the structure of the society as a whole 
(its primary and secondary components). 
The relations of the primary components may also fuse into 
ruptural unit with the secondary components without having con-
sequences for the relations of the system as a whole. In other 
words the contradiction is not a ruptural principle but consti-
tutes a secondary contradiction. Therefore there may be a 
disynchronou.c; relationship berween some of the elements of the 
primary components and some of the elements of the secondary 
components. For example, facilities utilized for the attainment 
of an end, and norms restricting the attainment of an end. An 
empirical instance would be the demand of workers for the right 
to strike for higher wages and the lack of trade unions as a faci-
lity for the attainment of this end in terms of a normative regu-
lation restricting the right to form a trade union. The con-
sequences of this conflict does not necessarily become operative 
for the system as a \'lhole unless all the normative and material 
components fuse in a unit and become a ruptural principle in the 
system as a whole. 
A reconstitution of the normative components does not involve 
a reconstitution of the relations of the system as a whole unless 
the normative components are interrelated (fused) with the material 
components in such a way as to become a ruptural principle. The 
elements of the normative components can be disynchronous such that 
only the elements of these components are reconstituted. This also 
constitutes a secondary contradiction. The relation between the 
secondary components are fused into a ruptural unit (by means of an 
accumulation of a set of conditions) but do not have consequences 
for the relations in the system as a whole. That this type of 
conflict involves only the normative components does not imply that 
the secondary contradiction does not take place within certain 
material limits. This would indicate an inconsistency in the ap-
proach of dialectical materialism which conceives of the process of 
conflict as involving both material and normative elements. 
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(The premise being that action is constituted by an interrelation 
of elements of the material and normative components.) The point 
is that logically and empirically the interrelation between the 
secondary components does not have a ruptural consequence (or 
function) for the relations in the system as a whole. 
An example of this type of contradiction is illustrated by a 
disynchronous relationship between norms and values. An empi-
rical instance of this would be a call by some ministers for the 
implementation of common worship regardless of race, in terms of 
the values of the Judeo-Christian ethic. The attainment of this 
value however, is restricted by norms regulating segregated .worship. 
This conflict does not have implications for the reconstitution 
of the material components of action and is therefore not a rup-
tural principle. However, this conflict has implications for the 
values and norms within a particular system. 
The problem of giving adequate explanation to the process of 
reconstitution is fundamental to a theory of social conflict. 
Thus far the emphasis of theoretical activity has been directed at 
the explanation of social conflict as a particular form of volun-
taristic action, and directed at an explanation of the process of 
reconstitution itself. The process of reconstitution must be given 
a theoretical reference point to gain explanatory power in a theory 
of social conflict. Given the assumption that a theoretical sys-
tern as a structurally given reference point is required where must 
the theoretical focus be in order to give explanation to social 
conflict? Two reference points are considered: 
the unit action system and the social action system. 
(3) UNIT ACTION SYSTEM AND SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEM 
The unit action system is the smallest structurally given 
reference point from which the analysis of human action is possible. 
The unit action system consists of the primitive components of ac-















HIE PARCHY OF 
ORGANIZATION 
this level concerns the action system of an 
individual actor in a role. The concept role is the dynamic 
category by means of which the process of action becomes opera-
tive in a system. In other words the role in terms of which 
an actor functions, represents the 'activation' of the 
material and normative limits of the action system of the indi-
vidual actor. The process of action involves the motivation 
or 'effort' of action towards a particular end,in terms of the 
utilization of means to the attainment of the end. Volunta-
ristically conceived this process involves subjective orientation 
and rationality (purposive action). 
A fundamental problem at this level of analysis is that the 
process of reconstitution concerns only the relations between the 
components of an individual action system. For example, if the 
individual role encumbent experiences a disynchronization between 
elements of normative regulation and value elements (that is, 
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conflict between these elements), the consequences of the process 
of reconstitution relate to the individual's action system. A 
husband who believes that affection is a general legitimating value 
in action but whose conduct is regulated in terms of norms re-
stricting his affection to his wife may experience conflict. 
This conflict however, does not necessarily have consequences 
for the action of all husband role encumbents. 
In developing a general theory of social conflict what is re-
quired is a level of analysis which focuses on the process of re-
constitution in terms of the action systems of a plurality of 
individual actors. To remain at the level of an individual's 
action system is to limit the scope of an explanation and in 
doing this, the explanatory power of the theory becomes restricted. 
In this study social conflict does not focus on the process of re-
constitution with reference to one actor or interaction between 
two actors. It is therefore necessary to consider another level 
of analysis in which the structure and functioning of a theore-
tically defined system refers to soci~l action, where social 
action is a process which takes place between a plurality of inter-
acting individuals, and where the components of action refer to 
structural relations incorporating a plurality of actors. This 
level of analysis is termed the social action system. 
The Social action system: 
The social action system consists of a plurality of inter-
acting individuals and structures of patterned interaction. If 
the social action system is to be the structurally given reference 
point from which to analyse social conflict, two additional concepts 
are required to give analytical content to a plurality of actors 
and the structured patterns of relations within the social action 
system. These two concepts are fundamental to theory of social 
conflict which tclkes the social action system as a structurally 
given point of reference. 
and institutions. 
The concepts are termed collectivities 
The concept collectivities refers to groups of actors and 
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therefore, not only to an individual. actor's role but a plu..,. 
rality of roles incorporated into structurally defined groups. 
The claim for voluntarism is extended to collectivities which 
are conceived of as actors. This claim for collective volun-
tarism attempts to overcome the inhibition of treating individual 
actors as the only valid structurally given reference points. 
That individual actors in sociological analysis are less reified 
than collectivities conceived of as actors, makes an easy con-
cession to methodological individualism. In the analysis of 
action there is no reason to believe that theorists reify indivi-
dual action less than they reify collective action. A concession 
to methodological individualism would remove the theorist from a 
commitment to the development of a general theory of social con-
flict. In a theory of conflict, the concept of collectivities 
is fundamental to the analysis of the process of reconstitution 
of the components of the social action system and not the indivi-
dual action system. Collectivities 'activate' the components of 
the social action system during the process of reconstitution. 
The components are no longer restricted to the action system of 
individuals but refer to structured patterns of interaction or 
the social structures of the social action system. This necessi-
tates the introduction of the second fundamental concept, institu-
tions. 
Although the components of the social action system are (as in 
unit action system) hierarchically organized into the material and 
normative limits of action, the components refer to collective pat-
terns or structures within which interaction takes place. These 
are the institutional structures. The elements of values, norms, 
and facilities incorporated into the means of production, are the 
major institutional structures of the social action system. 
(4) DEFINITION OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 
Social conflict was preliminary defined as a process invol-
ving a dialectical interrelation of the primary and secondary 
components (hierarchically organized) in a system in such a way 
as to give rise to the reconstitution of the relations in the 
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system as a whole, or specific relations in the system. Conflict 
was seen as a process involving two types of contradictions, the 
principle and secondary contradictions, which indicated a disyn-
chronization between the relations in the system. In the case of 
principle contradictions, a ruptural principle referred to the 
disynchronization of the primary and secondary components fused 
into a ruptural unit having consequences for the relations in the 
system as a whole. In the case of secondary contradictions the 
secondarf or primary and secondary components fuse into a ruptural 
unit indicating a disynchronization between specific relations in 
system. The development of the contradictions was seen as the 
result of a complex accumulation of conditions. 
Social conflict was then defined as a voluntaristic form of 
action. The postulate of voluntarism sees the process of action 
as involving a di'alectical interrelationship between the primary 
and secondary components which provide the 'limits' of action but 
within ''lhich courses of action are open. The process of recon-
stitution is therefore a dynamic voluntaristic process in which 
neither the primary or secondary components 'determine' acti:on. 
The principle of dialectical materialism sees both components as 
causally significant, and actors as the primum agens in social 
conflict. 
The social action system is the structurally given point of 
reference from which to examine the process of reconstitution. 
The components of action (as in the unit action system) are hier-
archically organized, but action refers to a plurality of actors 
and the components are the structured institutional patterns of 
interaction (and not patterns of individual action as in the unit 
action system). The process of reconstitution refers to the action 
of collectivities in institutions, hence social action system. 
Formally defined, social conflict is a particular form of 
action (where action is conceived of as voluntaristic), invol-
ving a plurality of actors (collectivities), and is that dynamic 
process by which the structural components (institutions) in the 
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social action system are reconstituted (as a whole or partially). 
THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT: 
Given the social action system as a point of reference, the 
last fundamental problem to be discussed relates to the determinant 
conditions in the system which cause conflict. Once it is clear 
what the process of reconstitution involves for the relations in 
the system,it is evident that the way in which the process takes 
place must be explained. 
The operation of the principle and secondary contradictions 
has preliminary been referred to as resulting from an accumulation 
of a set of conditions. These conditions relate to the function-
ing of the social action system. In the case of the principle 
contradiction this accumulation has been described in terms of the 
fusion of the primary and secondary components of the system in a 
disynchronous ~elationship, (a ruptural unit) according to a rup-
tural principle. In the case of secondary contradictions the accu-
mulation results in the fusion of the primary and secondary compo-
nents, or elements of the secondary components in a disynchronous 
relationship, (a ruptural unit). The insistence that in both cases 
an accumulation of conditions results in a process of reconstitution, 
indicates that there is no simple causal logic inherent in the ope-
ration of determinants. 
The operation of determinants of social conflict are con-
ceived of as a value-added process. Every determinant indicates 
a 'stage' which 'adds its value' to the process in which each 
determinant is a necessary condition for the next to operate as a 
determinant (J_O) · Therefore every determinant is a necessary 
10. Smelser (1970, p. 14) views the accumulation of the determinants 
of collective behaviour as a value-added process: 
Every stage in the value-added process, therefore, is a 
necessary condition for the appropriate and effective 




condition for the process of reconstitution to become opera-
tive for the relations in the system. 'Ihe sufficient condi-
tion for the final outcome of social conflict is the cumulative 
combination of every necessary condition. The accumulation of 
conditions is viewed not as a temporal process but as an analytic 
process. Each determinant is therefore logically necessary for 
the next condition to act as a determinant. 
The particular consequences of conflict depend on which 
relations in the system are 'activated' when the value-added 
process develops. The relations in the system may be disyn-
chronous before the operation of determinants begins. However, 
for the outcome of social conflict the .determinants must accu-
mulate and combine in relation to the functioning of the sys-
tem. For the determinants to become a ruptural principle, that 
is a principle contradiction, the relations between the primary and 
secondary components must be such that there is a disynchroniza-
tion between these elements which has consequences for the system 
as a whole. For the determinants to become operative in second-
ary contradictions, the relations between some of the components 
of the system must be disynchronized such that when the determi-
nants accumulate specific relations in the system become recon-
stituted. Therefore the determinants combine and have conse-
quences for the system depending on which relations in the sys-
tem are disynchronized. In other words the determinants of 
social conflict are linked to the functioning of the social action 
system. 
The determinants of social conflict and their relation to 
the process of reconstitution will now be discussed. As stated, 
the determinants accumulate according to a value-added process 
and become operative in the system in terms of a principle or 






The determinants of social conflict are structural con.;. 
duciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, precipi-
tating factors, mobilization for action, social control. 
Structural conduciveness: refers to the most general condition 
necessary for the process of reconstitution. The rela-
tions in the system must be disynchronized to some degree 
for the process of reconstitution to become operative. 
Depending on which relations in the system are disy.nchro-
nized, a principle or a secondary contradiction may be-
come operative. However, unless this determinant combines 
with the other determinants, the system at this general 
level m~y remain disynchronized for a long time. 
Structural strain: refers to the particular levels at which 
the relations in the system are disynchronized. This 
determinant can assume significance within the scope 
estab lised by prior conditions of conduciveness. To 
classify the types of strain in the system the relations 
between the components must be examined. Depending on 
which relations are strained, a principle or a secondary 
contradiction can become operative in the system. 
However, both structural conduciveness and structural 
strain may exist before contradictions become active in 
a process of reconstitution. 
Generalized beliefs: refer to the identification of the con-
ditions of strain by a plurality of actors. The crys-
tal1ization of generalized beliefs has the function of 
identifying or 'explaining' the sources of strain. Gene-
ralized beliefs can exist before becoming active in the 
process of reconstitution. Under conditions of condu-
civeness and strain however, generalized beliefs come into 
play as determinants of social conflict. Once the source 
of strain is identified, the location of disynchronization 
b d . . h d h h .!_'l~iP.~l ecomes more eterm1nant w1t regar to w et er a pr1~ 
or secondary contradiction will become operative in the 
system. 
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Precipitating ·factors: sharpen the definition of strain 
and conduciveness by activating the existence of 
these latter determinants. Precipitating factors 
must occur in the context of other determinants to 
have significance in the process of reconstitution. 
These factors relate to the particular strain expe-
rienced in the system. If there is present a disyn-
chronization between the primary and secondary con-
ponents, then one or more precipitating factors serve 
to identify and activate this disynchronization. 
In the same way precipitating factors can activate 
the disynchronized relations that refer to secondary 
contradictions. Precipitationg factors are logically 
prior to mobilization on the grounds that when the 
definition of strain is sufficiently sharpened the 
final necessary condition is that actors be mobilized 
in terms of the definition of strain. 
Mobilization of action: refers to the plurality of actors 
who 'prepare' for the activation of a principle or 
secondary contradiction. Once the other determinants 
are established, the final necessary condition to bring 
a collectivity into action is the mobilization of its 
actors. The process of reconstitution is therefore 
not a mechanistic development of contradictions in 
the system, in each stage it is the actors who are its 
motivating force. Depending on the-relations in the 
system which are disynchronized, the actors are mobi-
lized in terms of a principle or secondary contradic-
tion. In some cases the actors may be mobilized during 
the early stages of the operation of determinants or 
they may become mobilized during the actual outcome of 
conflict in the system. 
Social control: refers to those counter-determinants which 
at any stage prevent or inhibit the accumulation of 
determinants. There are social controls which miminize 
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conduciveness and strain and prevent the development 
of a process of reconstitution, and those which emerge 
only after social conflict becomes operative in the 
system. 
The accumulation of these determinants according to 
a value-added sequence,indicates the way in which the 
process of reconstitution develops and becomes operative 
for the relations in the social action system. These 
determinants are based on Smelser's (1970) determinants 
of collective behaviour. Smelser suggests the operation 
of the determinants in terms of a value-added process in 
which each determinant constitutes a necessary stage in 
the development of an outburst of collective behaviour. 
However, in relation to the structural components of 
action the functioning of these determinants differs 
fundamentally from Smelser's conception. 
Briefly, Smelser vie\~5 the components of action as orga-
nized according to a hierarchy with values as the com-
ponent that is central to the reconstitution of all the 
other components in the system. This is not to say that 
Smelser ignores the functioning of the determinants in 
relation to the material components (as defined in this 
study) of action. Smelser suggests that logically in 
terms of his conception of the hierarchy of components, 
a change in the definition of values would radically 
alter the organization of the components in the system. 
Logically, changes (or a reconstitution) of elements of 
what he calls 11situational facilities 11 do not involve 
changes in the norms or values, in the system. In 
other words according to Smelser (1970, pp. 33-34): 
Changes in basic values entail changes in the 
definition of norms, organization (roles of 
collectiveness) and facilities (material com-
ponents). Changes in norms entail changes 
in the definition of organization and facili-
ties, but not values. Changes in organization 
entail changes in the definition of facilities 
but not norms or values.. Changes in facilities, 
finally, do not necessarily impose any changes 
on the other components. (My insertions) 
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Smelser emphasizes that this is a logical conception of 
reconstitution and that empirical modifications at the lower levels 
that is, particularly at the level of situational facilities may 
initiate changes in the organization of roles, or accumulate to 
redefine norms or values. Logically, Smelsers' conception differs 
from the explanation of the process of reconstitution adopted in 
this study in the following ways: 
(i) According to Smelser, a redefinition of values gives rise 
to a redefinition of the other components in a system. 
This differs from 'a principle contradiction in that a 
redefinition of values in relation to the material compo-
nents constitutes a reconstitution of all the relations 
in the system. 
(ii) According to Smelser, a redefinition of norms does not 
entail a redefinition of values. This differs from a 
secondary contradiction in that a disynchronization 
between norms and values can give rise to a reconsti-
tution of both values and norms. 
(iii) According to Smelser, a redefinition of situational 
facilities does not logically entail a redefinition 
of either norms or values. This differs from another 
type of secondary contradiction in which a disynchronous 
relationship between some of the elements of the normative 
components in relation to for example, facilities,can 
constitute a reconstitution of part of the components in 
the system. Therefore a reconstitution of facilities can 
entail a reconstitution of norms. 
When Smelser's determinants of collective behaviour are applied 
as determinants of social conflict in this study, it is therefore 
important to note Smelser's organization of the components of action 
and his conception of interrelation during the process of reconsti-
tution. 
The theoretical problems relevant to an explanation of social 
conflict in this study have focused on: 
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(1) social conflict as a particular form of action, where 
action is defined in terms of the voluntaristic pos-
tulate; 
(2) the process of reconstitution seen as related to the. com-
ponents of action which become reconstituted according 
to the principle of dialectical contradictions in the 
system; 
(3) the social action system as the structurally given 
reference point from which the process of reconsti-
tution is explained; 
( 4) a definition of social conflict and the determinants 
of conflict within the social action system, 
Given the resolution of these theoretical problems it is now 
possible to proceed with a conclusion of this study and with 




(1) OUTLINE OF A GENERAL THEORY 
OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 
The development of an explanation of social conflict in this 
study has been governed by certain procedural considerations: 
(i) the location of the problem, that is. the posing of the 
problem within a particular methodological and theore-
tical framework; 
(ii) the definition of the problem, that is, in terms of a 
methodological and theoretical position; 
(iii) the formulation of an explanatory framework, that is, 
an outline of a theory of social conflict. 
The solution to these problems is not self-evident, even if it 
can be said that the 'truth' or 'essence' of social conflict already 
exists in empirical reality. Neither can the theoretical expression 
of a solution be taken for granted. The location of the problem, 
its specific definition, and the development of a theory requires 
theoretical labour. Hence the emphasis on theoretical activity 
which transforms the expression of a problem into a systematically 
structured framework within which the problem can be explained. The 
theoretical activity in this study has aimed at the development of a 
framework for a theory of social conflict. In terms of the commitment 
to the formulation of a scientific theory of social conflict, the theo.-
retical activity has focused specifically on theory validation and for-
mulation within scientific methodology. 
In order to formulate a theory of social conflict the general 
issues relating to the logic of justification and explanation are seen 
as fundamental with regard to the theoretical activity in this study. 
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Sociologists too often short-circuit their analysis of particular 
problems by leaving unexamined their methodological and theoretical 
premises. 
ticism. 
The price of this neglect is undoubtedly formless eclec-
If sociological theory is to be taken seriously it must come to 
terms with what can be called the burning questions of the sociolo-
gists' commitment to science. Only then can the laments that socio-
logy consists of no theories of social reality be confidently challenged. 
For the prerequisite of the development of theories in a discipline 
is the explication of methodological and theoretical premises within a 
common court of appeal. In this case, the scientific court of appeal. 
The methodological premises of social conflict refer to the ques-
tion of 'How' social conflict can be explained. By means of a cri-
tical examination of certain methodological problems, a methodological 
position was developed! The fundamental premises are outlined as 
follows: 
(i) It is maintained that the problem of explanation must be 
seen in terms of the general canons of the scientific 
method. Therefore the problem of explanation is located 
within the framework constituted by scientific methodolo-
gy. More specifically, in relation to the validation and 
formulation of a theory of social conflict. 
(ii) Therefore the validation of a theory of social conflict is 
characterized by a common logic of justification, the rationale 
by which an explanation is accepted or rejected. The plea 
for a separate logic of justification was dismissed on the 
grounds that the logic of justification does n<'t refer to the 
problems encountered in the sphere of empirical inquiry, but 
is constituted by the criteria (the rationale) in terms of 
which an explanation is accepted or rejected~ Further, given 
this view, the logic of justification is not a matter of the 
different techniques utilized in empirical inquiry. The 
misconceptions relating to the nature and function of science 
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were critically examined in terms of the reproductive fal-
lacy. The aim of science is the systematic accumulation 
of knowledge for the purposes of explanation and prediction. 
This aim does not include the reproduction of social reality 
(an i~possible task for a scientist or anyone else). 
(iii) Given the acceptance of a common logic of justification 
the construction of an explanation of social conflict is 
based on the logic of explanation inherent in scientific 
formulations. The systematization of concepts and propo-
sitions in a logically integrated system, demands the con-
struction of a theory of social conflict. A theoretical 
system is seen as a structural point of reference from 
which it becomes possible to explain the phenomenon of 
social conflict. The liberal claim for partial formaliza-
tion is seen as a strategy for theory construction in the 
social sciences. The aim of a fully formalized deductive 
theory remains an ideal of science and is not viewed as a 
restrictive criterion inhibiting theory construction. 
Neither does the plea for partial formalization legitimate a 
claim for methodological separatism. Theoretical activity 
would be removed from the realm of the scientific enterprise 
if partial formalization necessitated a claim for methodolo-
gical separatism. 
Given the location of the problem of explanation within the frame-
work of the scientific method, the following premises, specifical)y with 
reference to social conflict are adopted: 
(i) Social conflict seen as a dynamic process is accessible to 
analysis when the concepts 'structure' and 'function' are 
methodologically admitted. Only the identification of a 
structural point of reference makes it possible to examine 
the functioning of a system. The methodological approach 
in terms of this assumption is termed the Structural- Functional 
approach. The criticism of a formalistic structuralism or a 
static functionalism indicates the necessity of linking the 
(ii) 
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concepts structure and function in such a way that social 
conflict can be examined as a dynamic process. 
The dialectic as a system of relational logic is a method 
capable of conceptualiZing social conflict as a process of 
reconstitution. The components of the system interrelate 
(fuse) indicating a disynchronization between the relations 
in the system. This disynchronization was conceptualized 
as giving rise to contradictions which 'rupture' the internal 
relations of the system. The relations of the system can be 
disynchronized so that a reconstitution of the system as a 
whole (principle contradiction) takes place, or a partial 
reconstitution (secondary contradiction) of the relations in 
the system takes place~ 
(iii) In terms of the premises of dialectical materialism a logi-
cal distinction is made between the primary (material) and 
secondary (normative) components of the system. The pro-
cess of reconstitution refers to the functioning of both 
these components (that is, their interrelation). Material-
ism (which reduces the dynamics of a system to the material 
components) and idealism (which reduces the dynamics of a 
system to the emanation of normative components),are rejected 
as scientifically inadmissable positions for the putposes of 
the logic of an explanation of social conflict. 
The theoretical premises of the study of social conflict refer to 
the question of 'What' concepts and propositions are required to explain 
social conflict, given the assumption that it entails a process of 
interrelation and reconstitution of the relations in a system. The 
fundamental premises are outlined as follows: 
(i) Social conflict is a form of voluntaristic action. The em-
phasis an social conflict as a form of action indicates that 
it is human actors who are the primum agens in the process 
of reconstitution. The conception of voluntarism.is predi-
cated on the assumption that the process of action itself 
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is comprised of an interrelationship of material (primary) 
and normatiye (secondary) components. In terms of the 
premises of dialectical materialism, these components are 
hierarchically organized and form the'limits' within whicl; 
action takes place. An ide a list or materialist position 
denies the interrelation of these components and neglects 
human action as the motive force in social processes. 
Social conflict as a process of reconstitution refers to 
the disynchronization of the relations between the com-
ponents of the voluntaristic action system. 
(ii) Given the assumption of voluntarism and dialectical 
materialism, the social action system is taken as the 
structurally given point of reference (in contrast to the 
individual action system) from which to analyse the pro-
cess of reconstitution. The social action system consists 
of a plurality of actors, collectivities, interacting with-
in the hierarchically organized structural conponents, in-
stitutions. The conception of voluntarism is extended to 
collectivities, and the process of reconstitution refers 
to the disynchronous relations between the institutions of 
the_social action system. The institutions are logically 
constituted by the primary (material) components and second-
ary (normative) components of social action. A princi-
ple contradiction refers to the process of reconstitution 
which becomes operative for the relations of the system as 
a whole, and refers to the interrelation of the primary and 
secondary components. The interrelation between these com-
ponents may also give rise to a ~~ondary contradiction which 
has consequences for only some of the relations in the sys-
tem. The interrelation between the elements of the second-
ary components may also give rise to a secondary contra-
diction which does not have consequences for the relations 
of the system as a whole. 
The social action system is the most general structurally 
given point of reference for the analysis of the process of 
reconstitution. Therefore the social action system forms 
the unit of analysis in a general theory of social conflict. 
(iii) 
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The determinants of social conflict refer to the function-
ing of the structural components in the social action sys-
tem. The operation of determinants during a process of 
reconstitution is conceived of in terms of a value-added 
logic. Each determinant is logically necessary for the 
next to become operative,and the combination of every 
determinant is the sufficient condition for the outcome 
of social conflict in the social action system. (The 
determinants are structural conduciveness, structural strain, 
crystallization of a generalized beliefj precipitating fac-
tors, mobilization for action, social control.) If the 
relations in the system are disynchronized in such a way as 
to fuse (interrelate) into a ruptural principle, the com-
bination of the determinants becomes operative in a process 
which results in a principle contradiction. In other words 
the structural relations in the system as a whole are recon-
stituted. If the relations in the system are disynchronized 
and fuse into a ruptural unit, the combination of the deter-
minants becomes operative in a process which results in a 
secondary contradiction. That is to say, parts of the rela-
tions in the system are reconstituted. 
These methodological and theoretical premises constitute an out-
line of a general theory of social conflict. The analysis of con-
flict is not conceived of as possible without the outline presented 
in this study -- the out line constitutes the fundamental premises 
on which to base a general theory of social conflict. Hence the 
task of this study --- Social Conflict : Towards a Methodological 
and Theoretical Position. 
(2) CONTEMPORARY 'CONFLICT' THEORIES 
Contemporary 'conflict' theorists have focused on particular 
aspects of the phenomenon of social conflict. Smelser (1970) 
has studied collective behaviour and given an outline of a general 
theory of collective behaviour. Dahrendorf (1969) has produced 
an account of class conflict in modern industrial society. 
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Rex (1970) has attempted to develop a conflict model of the 
social system. Other theorists have studied the functions of 
conflict, revolution, social change, and international conflict. 
A critical review of these recent theories in terms of the fun-
damental premises adopted in this study can serve as a basis for 
the analysis of the shortcomings encountered in contemporary 
theories of social conflict. Smelser, Dahrendorf, and Rex are 
briefly discussed for the purpose of illustrating some of the.:issues 
raised by this study. 
Smelser adopts the Parsonian framework of action and looks at 
collective behaviour. The structural components are hierarchically 
organized such that values are central to the functioning of the social 
action system. According to Smelser, collective behaviour analysed 
as a process involves the reconstitution (or redefinition) of the struc-
t~al components of the system. Although Smelser sees values as cen-
tral to the functioning of the system, he has attempted to formulate a 
theory of collective behaviour that gives weight to the material com-
ponents of action or what he has termed situational facilities. This 
is indicated by the emphasis he gives to factors such as structural 
conduciveness and structural strain as determinants of collective be-
haviour. However, Smelser's view of the hierarchical relations be-
tween the components of action, commits him to a position of value 
determinism with rega.rd to the process of reconstitution which becomes 
operative for the relations of the system as a whole. As previously 
stated,he does not neglect the importance of the other components 
of action but he does not stress the interrelationship between the 
normative components and the non-normative components in a process 
whereby the system as a whole is reconstituted. The premise of the 
interelation of the components of social action is fundamental to a 
voluntaristic conception of social conflict --- a refutation of value 
determinism (and a materialist determinism). 
Smelser's definition of collective behaviour as the mobilization 
of action to reconstitute a component of social action on the basis 
of a generalized belie£ is not satisfactory in terms of the postulate 
of voluntarism. Social conflict as a form of collective behaviour 
involves action which consists of both normative components (beliefs) 
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and material components (situational facilities). The process of 
reconstitution is rooted in the conditions of action and oriented 
towards (or in terms of) particular beliefs. While Smelser do~s 
specify the determinant conditions which give rise to a process of 
reconstitution,his definition of collective behaviour implies an 
emphasis on the normative components of action. 
Smelser's view of collective behaviour is based on the assump-
tion that collective behaviour is an uninstitutionalized mobili-
zation of action. The implication of this view is that the struc-
tures of social action are not in themselves constitutive of con-
flict. While it may be acceptable to see some incidents of collect-
ive behaviour as exogenous, for example, a panic during a sudden fire 
in a cinema, it is not legitimate to claim that all incidents of col-
lective behaviour are external to the fw1ctioning ofthe structures of 
the social action system. Smelser's proposition that collective 
behaviour is 1minstitutionalized appears to contradict his conceptua-
li zation of the determinants of collective behaviour. The accumulation 
of the determinants relate to the internal structure of the system, 
for example, structural strain, social control, precipitating factors. 
If Smelser is saying that collective behaviour is uninstitutionalized 
in terms of the dominant values of a particular system, then his mean-
ing of the term is unclear. The mobilization of participants for 
action, the crystallization of generalized beliefs in a norm-oriented 
or a value-oriented movement (two forms of collective behaviour which 
Smelser analyses) involve institutionalized action,whether the action 
is viewed in terms of the dominant values of a system or not. 1be 
crucial question is whether a process of reconstitition such as a 
norm-oriented or value-oriented social movement arises out of condi-
tions which are external to the functioning of the system. If this 
is what Smelser implies by collective behaviour as uninstitutiona-
lized, he is refuting the fundamental premise that the process of 
reconstitution is internal to the functioning of the components of the 
system. 
Dahrendorf retains a revised definition of Marx's concept of 
class and analyses a specific aspect of conflict. According to 
Dahrendorf conflict is generated within the institutional structures 
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of modern industrial society. Conflict arises from, and is rela-
ted to the authority structures inherent in institutions or what 
he terms imperatively co-ordinated associations. Therefore, in 
contrast to Smelser, Dahrendorf sees .conflict as intrinsically re-
lated to the elements of the social structure itself. In modern in-
dustrial society conflict is institutionalized, a process incorpo-
rated in the functioning of the social structure. 
Dahrendorf maintains that conflict arises in different segments 
of the social structure, for example, the political institutions, or 
the economic institutions. However, he does not attempt to analyse 
the relations of conflict between different institutions,but claims 
that conflict varies from institution to institution according to the 
relations of authority. 
It has been suggested in this study that conflict arises between 
the elements of the components of the social action system, for example 
material components and normative components, or norms and values. 
The process of reconstitution refers to the structural components (of 
social action) in their dynamic interrelation within a systemic frame 
of reference. Dahrendorf suggests that in modern industrial society 
the conflict relations within institutional structures do not necessa-
rily have consequences for the reconstitution of the system as a whole~ 
unless the conflicts in particular institutions are superimposed upon 
one another. The critical question with regard to the systematization 
of an explanation of social conflict is the construction of a structu-
ral point of reference from which it is possible to analyse the con-
sequences of conflict for the relations between the components of the 
system taken as a whole, or relation between the elements of the sys-. 
tern. 
Dahrendorf 1s view of institutions as based on coercion, that is, 
on patterns of domination and subjection is inconsistent with his pro-
position that social structures tend toward conflict and change. If 
he defines authority as legitimate power then authority relations 
are characterized by the legitimation of dominance and subjection. 
The process of reconstitution refers to the contradiction or disyn-
chronization in the relations of the system, and therefore one of the 




the strain existing in the system. Thus a breakdown of legitimacy 
is implied. The fu:rther implication of Dahrendorf' s view of coer-
cion is that conflict in the sense of reconstitution, is not logi-
cally possible within the structures of author5ty in an impera-
tively co-ordinated association. Dahrendorf discusses the basis 
of conflict in society but does not conceptualize how conflict itself 
functions to rec~1nstitute the relations of authority. He discusses 
the formation of conflict groups in terms of manifest and latent 
interests but does not analyse the process of conflict itself. If 
conflict is to be viewed as a form of voluntaristic action l'l'hich re-
constitutes the structural relations in a system,th.en it is crucial 
to conceptualize the way in which conflict becomes operative in a 
system. 
Rex attempts to formulate a conflict model of the social system. 
He agrees with Dahrendorf that conflict is related to the structures 
of the social system, that is, conflict arises from the functioning 
of the structure,s within the social system. Rex, in contrast to 
Dahrendorf, maintains that conflict does not vary randomly in the 
system but rela.tes to the-system taken as a whole even if conflict is 
present only in different segments of the system. 
Rex suggests that the basis of conflict is characterized by the 
balance of power in society and the actual process of conflict itself 
involves the interrelation of the material and normative components of 
the system. Social conflict as a form of action within this frame-
work, is characterized by the interaction of ruling groups and subor-
dinat·e groups (in terms of their relation to the balance of pm'<'er). 
If there is a change in the balance of power, Rex argues that the re-
lations of the system as a whole may change (or be reconstituted). 
He maintains that it is important for a conflict model to include con-
cepts that conceptualize change in a system. 
Rex's conflict model represents a valuable attempt at formulating 
an approach to social conflict. His focus on the action frame of re-
ference indicates a concern with the conception of conflict as volun-
taristic, a process involving both the normative and material components 
of action (as termed by him, the means and ends of action). He views 
- 67 -
conflict as a process taking place \d thin the structures of the 
social system and conceptualizes conflict 
change in the structures of the system. 
the task of systematizing an approach to 
as a process of dynamic 
Rex has contributed to 
social conflict. 
It is firmly maintained that if the sociological study of 
social conflict can apply the premises outlined in this study the 
task of developing a theory of social conflict will not be rele-
gated to the realm of the impossible. Neither will the study of 
social conflict be viewed with scepticis.m and criticised as irre-
levant with regard to the crises faced in Western society. For 
as Bottomore (1970, p. 153) suggests: 
Conflict is an intrinsic part of social life, 
sustaining, modifying, or destroying the social 
groups in which it takes place. It cannot be 
treated satisfactorily as a minor and exception-
al form of social relationship, in a brief apolo-
gic appendix to a theory of social solidarity, 
as has so often been done. Whether we like it 
or not, we shall have to pay increasing attention 
to conflicts of interest and doctrine, and to the 
role of violence in upholding or overthrowing a 
social system, if we are to explain events and 
provide the means by which men can make reasonable 
choices between alternative courses of social action. 
And on the other side we shall need to eliminate 
from sociological thought the vestiges of the melt-
ing pot ideology, which assumes that vast inequali-
ties of wealth, power, and enjoyment can and should 
be harmoniously accommodated without any fundamental 
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